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“[I]t is problematic to impose a binary division on human beings who are far more diverse than the 
assumptions behind the labels ‘male’ and ‘female.’” 1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 When a woman gets pregnant, the most prevalent question she gets asked is, 
“[b]oy or girl?”2  Family and friends celebrate the new arrival of the child with baby 
showers and, more recently, gender reveal parties.3  If gender is a black and white 
concept (or, rather, blue and pink), then one would expect the separation of male and 
female athletes to be a breeze.4  This is simply not the case.5  This comment will 
examine the legal rights individuals have when changing, altering, or amending their 
legal classification for sex/gender in the context of the Olympics.6   
 Part II will examine the Olympics’ historical struggle to determine how gender 
and sex are verified and classified as well as constitutional issues regarding 
discrimination and invasion of privacy.7  Parts III and IV will describe the most recent 
athlete, Dutee Chand, who challenged the Olympics’ hyperandrogenism regulations 
and her partial success.8  Part V will briefly examine the commonly proposed options 
for how the Olympics could split athletes for competition and the legal issues 
                                                          
* B.S. in Chemistry, Villanova University, 2016; J.D., Villanova University Charles Widger School of 
Law, 2019; M.B.A., Villanova University School of Business, 2019.  I would like to dedicate this article 
to those affected by biased rules, regulations, and laws, especially those that exclude nonbinary 
individuals.  I would like to thank my family, especially my parents, Neil and Victoria, for their 
constant support.  I would also like to thank my friends at Villanova, who had to hear all about the 
writing and editing of this article and probably know more now about the subject matter than I do.  
Lastly, I would like to thank God, for without Him none of this would be possible. 
1 Erin Buzuvis, Hormone Check: Critique of Olympic Rules on Sex and Gender, 31 WIS. J. L. GENDER & 
SOC’Y 29, 29 (pontificating complexities of humans in regards to gender, gender identity, and sex 
categories in relation to generally-accepted notions of sport categorization). 
2 See Jen Willsea, Please Stop Asking If My Baby Is a Boy or a Girl, HUFFPOST (Jun. 5, 2017, 2:56 PM, 
updated Jun. 6, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/please-stop-asking-if-my-baby-is-a-
boy-or-a-girl_us_5935a65de4b0cfcda9169b3f (critiquing important of sex before baby is even born). 
3 See Martie Sirois, A Word of Caution on Gender Reveal Parties, HUFFPOST (Aug. 8, 2016, 8:38 PM, 
updated Aug. 9, 2016) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/a-word-of-caution-on-gender-reveal-
parties_us_57a8f834e4b08f5371f1d001 (“Gender reveal parties are one of the hottest trends among 
today’s expectant parents. They’ve been going on for at least eight years, but in case you aren’t 
familiar, gender reveal parties are meant to be exactly what they imply: getting a group of friends 
and/or family together with the expectant parents for a party, and “revealing” the baby’s gender at 
one time so that everyone present can celebrate the biological sex of the upcoming birth.”). 
4 See INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., Olympic Charter (Aug. 2, 2016) (neglecting to define gender or sex within 
the International Olympic Committee charter). 
5 See Russel Goldman, Here’s a List of 58 Gender Options for Facebook Users, ABC NEWS (Feb. 13, 2014), 
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2014/02/heres-a-list-of-58-gender-options-for-facebook-
users/ (listing fifty-eight different gender options that Facebook users can select when creating a 
profile). 
6 For a full discussion of legal rights both internationally and in the U.S., see infra notes 53–72 and 
accompanying text. 
7 For a historical analysis of sex and gender verification in the Olympic Games, see infra notes 73–109 
and accompanying text. 
8 For a discussion of Dutee Chand’s appeal to the Court of Arbitration for Sport see infra notes 103–
174.  
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stemming therefrom.9  The last section of Part V will propose a new approach to 
athletic classification in the Olympic arena, consider constitutional issues this proposal 
faces, and explain why hormone ranges remain the best option the Olympics 
Committee has.10  This last proposal encompasses a dramatic shift toward the 
hormone testing of all athletes regardless of sex and rids the Olympics of sex/gender 
classification, which best combats the constitutional and legal issues surrounding all 
other options available to the Olympic Games.11  
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
 The Olympics are a time-honored tradition.12  Families from all over the globe 
crowd around their televisions every other year to watch as world-renowned athletes 
compete for medals in their country’s honor.13  Athletes, however, are funneled into 
one of two sex categories when attempting to achieve their goals as a competitor.14  
With the rise in acceptance of genders other than the “traditional” male and female 
labels, the Olympics have been challenged with competition categories.15 
 
A. Definitions 
 
 In order to have a conversation about gender, sex, and transgender athletes, it 
is important to establish the meaning of these words.16  Sex is defined by Black’s Law 
Dictionary as “[t]he sum of the peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish 
a male from a female organism; gender.”17  This raises the first point of contention, 
because sex and gender are not the same; however, it is clear that under the guise of 
the law, they are treated equally.18  Black’s Law Dictionary defines gender as the 
“difference between men and women based on culturally and socially constructed 
mores, politics, and affairs” while many other legal sources use sex and gender 
interchangeably.19  Pending lawsuits struggle to find a difference between gender and 
                                                          
9 For common proposals on how to remedy the sex/gender classification/verification issue, see infra 
notes 202–280 and accompanying text. 
10 For a new approach regarding athletic categories, see infra notes 256–280 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 256–280 and accompanying text. 
12 See John J. MacAloon, Double Visions: Olympic Games and American Culture, THE KENYON REVIEW 
Vol. 4 No. 1, 98–112 (1982) (describing the prevalence of the Olympics in American culture and 
stating all Americans have seen the Olympics at least once). 
13 See id. (stating approximately one third of humans alive in 1976 watched the Olympics). 
14 See Linda Sheryl Greene, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall – Gender, Olympic Competition and Persistence of the 
Feminine Ideal, 31 WIS. J. L. GENDER & SOC’Y 57, 60 (“The [IOC’s] conference produced a document 
entitled ‘Women’s Participation in Athletics’ which imposed substantial limitations and noted 
distinctions between male and female Olympic competition and provided a basis for the imposition of 
limits on those who qualify as female for purposes of Olympic competition.”). 
15 See Goldman, supra note 5 (listing fifty-eight different gender options that Facebook users can select 
when creating a profile). 
16 For the definitions that will control this article see infra notes 17–37 and accompanying text. 
17 Sex, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (including as a definition of ‘sex,’ ‘gender’). 
18 See Sex, THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003) (“Either of the two main form of 
individuals that occur in many species and that are distinguished respectively as female or male 
especially on the basis of their reproductive organs and structures.”) 
19 Gender, BLACK’S supra note 17. 
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sex.20  Gender, as this article will treat it, is “[t]he behavioral, cultural, or psychological 
traits typically associated with one sex.”21  Gender, unlike sex, cannot be determined 
based on biological criteria, but is rather defined by a person’s gender identity.22   
 Gender and sex have been long misunderstood concepts in courts in the U.S.23  
Courts have consistently misused terminology and conflated sex and gender into one 
concept.24  It is not uncommon for courts to interchangeably use the terms “sex” and 
“gender” as well was “transsexual” and “transgender.”25  In addition to conflating the 
two terms, courts have referred to individuals as both transsexual and transgender 
regardless of whether they have undergone sex reassignment surgery.26  Lastly, courts 
have created terms such as “gender non-conformity” instead of referring to individuals 
as breaking gender norms and “gender transition” instead of sex reassignment surgery 
or simply transition.27  The former is problematic because gender is a chosen 
characteristic of an individual, a person cannot be “gender non-conforming.”28  The 
latter is problematic because a person can only receive surgery to reassign his or her 
sex organs, not his or her gender identity.29 
 If a person’s biological or assigned sex conflicts with his or her gender identity, 
then that person may pursue sex reassignment surgery.30  Even without the sex 
reassignment surgery, a person whose gender identity conflicts with his or her assigned 
                                                          
20 See, e.g., Elise Bloom & Andrew Smith, Does ‘Sex’ in Title IX Include Gender Identity?, THE NAT’L LAW 
JOURNAL (Dec. 5, 2016) 
http://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/1202773792254/?slreturn=20170922151932 
(describing courts’ trouble interpreting sex, gender, gender identity in lawsuits). 
21 Gender, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 18. 
22 See Gender identity, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., https://www.transequality.org (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2017) (defining gender identity as a person’s elected gender) 
23 For a discussion regarding how courts in the U.S. have struggled with compartmentalizing sex and 
gender as concepts see infra notes 24–29. 
24 Compare Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 295 (U.S.D.C. 2008) (characterizing male-to-female 
transsexual correctly and offering a definition for gender identity); with Macy v. Holder, 2012 WL 
1435995 (E.E.O.C. 2012) (using correct definitions of ‘transgender,’ ‘gender identity,’ and ‘change of 
sex’); with Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, LLC, 641 Fed. App’x. 883, 883 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Sex 
discrimination includes discrimination against a transgender person for gender non-conformity”) 
(citing Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316–17 (11th Cir. 2011)) (stating terms such as ‘gender non-
conformity’ and ‘gender transition,’ where neither are accurate statements because gender is chosen by 
individuals); with Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2016) (referring to ‘gender non-
conformity’ and interchangeably using ‘sex’ and ‘gender’). 
25 See Chavez, 641 Fed. App’x. at 883 (discussing gender transition instead of sex reassignment 
surgery); see also Hively, 830 F.3d 698 (referring to ‘gender non-conformity’ and interchangeably using 
‘sex’ and ‘gender’). 
26 See generally Chavez, 641 Fed. App’x. at 883 (discussing gender transition instead of sex reassignment 
surgery). 
27 See id. at 883 (using the term gender non-conformity when referring to stereotyping and gender 
norms); see also generally Hively, 830 F.3d 698 (using gender non-conformity). 
28 See Chavez, 641 Fed. App’x. at 883 (using the term gender non-conformity when referring to 
stereotyping and gender norms); see also generally Hively, 830 F.3d 698 (using gender non-conformity); 
for a full discussion on the difference between sex and gender see supra notes 17–22. 
29 See Chavez, 641 Fed. App’x. at 883 (using the term gender non-conformity when referring to 
stereotyping and gender norms); see also generally Hively, 830 F.3d 698 (using gender non-conformity); 
for a full discussion on gender identity versus sex reassignment surgery see infra notes 30–33. 
30 See Sex Reassignment Surgery, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., supra note 22 (defining sex 
reassignment surgery as the process of physically changing one’s biological sex organs to conform 
with one’s gender identity). 
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or biological sex is transgender.31  The process of changing one’s gender expression 
(the outward expression or appearance of a person) to conform with one’s gender 
identity is called transitioning.32  If an individual decides to pursue sex reassignment 
surgery, there is one for each of the sexes.33   
 When a person does not exhibit any identifying or classifying sexual organs, 
he or she is intersex.34  Although an individual may be intersex and may have 
ambiguous genitals, many are unaware of their difference in sex development (DSD) 
and grow up associating with their predominantly visible sex (whichever sex for which 
they develop more characteristic traits).35  Some experts contend that testosterone is 
the biological hormone that differentiates males from females, but intersex individuals 
with hyperandrogenism and androgen insensitivities “cause[] a person to produce high 
levels of hormones” without necessarily absorbing them.36  The measure employed by 
the Olympics to determine hormone levels consists of sampling how many nano moles 
of testosterone there are per liter of serum in the blood.37 
                                                          
31 See Transgender, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 18 (“Of, relating to, or being a person whose gender 
identity differs from the sex the person had or was identified as having at birth.”); see also Transgender, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., supra note 22 (using a definition highly comparable to 
Merriam-Webster). 
32 See Transitioning, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., supra note 22 (defining transitioning as a 
lifestyle change during which an individual begins to live as his or her gender identity). 
33 See Male-to-Female, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., supra note 22 (“MTF [male-to-female]: 
A person who transitions from ‘male-to-female,’ meaning a person who was assigned male at birth, 
but identifies and lives as a female.  Also known as a ‘transgender woman.’”); see also Female-to-Male, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., supra note 22 (“FTM [female-to-male]: A person who 
transitions from ‘female-to-male,’ meaning a person who was assigned female at birth, but identifies 
and lives as a male.  Also known as a ‘transgender male.’”) 
34 See Intersex, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., supra note 22 (“A term used for people who 
are born with a reproductive or sexual anatomy and/or chromosome pattern that does not seem to fit 
typical definitions of male or female.  Intersex conditions are also known as differences of sex 
development (DSD).”) 
35 See, e.g., Chand v. AFI & IAAF, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 4–5 (Jul. 24, 2015) (stating facts regarding 
Dutee Chand’s medical testing leading to discovery of her intersex condition). 
36 Hyperandrogenism Explained and What it Means for Athletics, USA TODAY (Aug. 2, 2016, 3:35 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/olympics/2016/08/02/hyperandrogenism-explained-and-
what-it-means-for-athletics/87944968/ (explaining that hyperandrogenism presents in many forms 
but most common in Olympics regulation is overproduction of testosterone by intersex female 
athletes); see Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome, U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED., 
https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/001180.htm (last updated Aug. 16, 2017) (“Androgen 
insensitivity syndrome (AIS) is when a person who is genetically male (who has one X and one Y 
chromosome) is resistant to male hormones (called androgens). As a result, the person has some or all 
of the physical traits of a woman, but the genetic makeup of a man.”); see also Testosterone, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, supra note 18 (defining testosterone as the sex hormone typically associated with males); for 
a full discussion of the impact of testosterone on an athlete’s athletic advantage, see infra notes 92-105 
and accompanying text. 
37 See, e.g., Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (explaining levels of testosterone in “normal” males and females 
as well as those present in Dutee Chand and other intersex athletes); see also Ruth Padawer, The 
Humiliating Practice of Sex-Testing Female Athletes, THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE (June 28, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/03/magazine/the-humiliating-practice-of-sex-testing-female-
athletes.html (differentiating levels of testosterone in average males and females as opposed to 
intersex athletes); see also Grace Carr, Here’s What the 2018 Olympic Gender Regulations Look Like, THE 
DAILY CALLER NEWS FOUND. (Jul. 3, 2017, 2:28 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2017/07/03/heres-
what-the-2018-olympic-gender-regulations-look-like/ (differentiating levels of testosterone in average 
males and females as opposed to intersex athletes); see also Christie Aschwanden, The Olympics are Still 
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B. Emergence of the Issue 
 
 A vast majority of sports fans have probably never given a second thought to 
gender classifications in the Olympics.38  However, the issue is far more common than 
most would suspect.39  A new look at gender classification in the Olympics emerged 
over the past few years with Caitlyn Jenner’s transition, Caster Semenya’s triumphant 
win of several gold medals at the Rio Olympics, and Dutee Chand’s high-profile case 
against the International Association of Athletics Federation (IAAF) and Athletic 
Federation of India (AFI).40  Chand, who has gained notoriety over challenging the 
IAAF and AFI, was recommended for hormonal testing after a preliminary round of 
the Olympics.41  The appeal that Chand filed with the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
(CAS) was decided in 2015 and gave the IAAF until 2017 to introduce new evidence.42  
The CAS suspended hormonal gender testing unless and until the IAAF could produce 
verification that higher testosterone levels gave female athletes an athletic advantage 
proportional to the normal male-to-female advantage.43 
 In response to Chand’s case with the CAS, the International Olympics 
Committee (IOC) suspended gender testing for the upcoming South Korea games in 
                                                          
Struggling to Define Gender, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jun. 28, 2016, 3:24 PM), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-olympics-are-still-struggling-to-define-gender/ 
(differentiating levels of testosterone in average males and females as opposed to intersex athletes); 
for a full discussion on the levels of testosterone accepted for male and female professional athletes, 
see infra notes 92–105 and accompanying text. 
38 For a discussion on how this issue reemerged in recent years, see infra notes 40–43 and 
accompanying text. 
39 See, e.g., Greene, supra note 14, at 60–61 (“A stunning female success by Helen Stephens . . . gave 
rise to charges that she was a female imposter; an official examined her genitals in order to confirm 
her gender.”); see also Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 32 (discussing several instances in which female athletes 
were accused of “gender fraud”); see also UNIV. OF MINNESOTA, Rio Olympics Raise New Questions About 
Sex-Testing Athletes (Aug. 4, 2016), https://consortium.umn.edu/news/rio-olympics-raise-new-
questions-about-sex-testing-athletes (discussing Helen Stephens and Stella Walsh as examples of 
females accused of gender fraud). 
40 See, e.g., Aschwanden, supra note 37 (discussing Jenner’s view on IOC’s regulations); see generally 
Guardian Sport, What is an Intersex Athlete?  Explaining the Case of Caster Semenya, THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 
29, 2016, 7:13 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2016/jul/29/what-is-an-intersex-athlete-
explaining-the-case-of-caster-semenya (detailing Semenya’s case against the IAAF); see generally Chand, 
CAS 2014/A/3759. 
41 See Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 42–43 (discussing CAS’s use of suspicion-based testing in modern era 
as opposed to mandatory testing for all women). 
42 See generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (holding in interim arbitral award that Hyperandrogenism 
Regulations are suspended for following two years and that IAAF is permitted to submit further 
evidence of hormone advantage during this time). 
43 See generally id. (holding partially that IAAF has ability to submit further evidence any time before 
July 2017) (holding also that average male-to-female competitive athletic advantage is 10-13% as 
opposed to 1-3% advantage for hyperandrogenic women over women without DSDs); for a more 
detailed discussion on Chand’s appeal to the CAS, see infra notes 140–161 and accompanying text. 
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2018.44  Previously, the IOC adopted the IAAF’s testosterone rule from 2014.45  The 
CAS suspended the IAAF’s testosterone rule due to lack of evidence of athletic 
advantage for those with higher testosterone levels.46  Further, testosterone levels of 
Olympic-level athletes tend to be skewed due to over-training, athleticism, and the use 
of performance enhancing drugs.47  Typical females and males have a large separation 
of testosterone levels, but Olympic-level athletes tend to have a constant range where 
males and females overlap.48  Further, a normal male-to-female athletic advantage is 
estimated to be between 10–13%, while there is little to no data to suggest that intersex 
female athletes carry this same advantage in relation to women without DSDs.49  In 
fact, it is hypothesized that female athletes with hormonal issues only experience a 1-
3% advantage over females that produce an average amount of testosterone and other 
hormones.50  Lastly, there is no scientific evidence that testosterone alone accounts for 
the advantage between males and females.51  Testosterone is the most highly produced 
                                                          
44 See generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759; see also IOC Consensus Meeting on Sex Reassignment and 
Hyperandrogenism November 2015, INT’L OLYMPIC COMMITTEE (Nov. 2015), 
https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/Commissions_PDFfiles/Medical_commission/2015-
11_ioc_consensus_meeting_on_sex_reassignment_and_hyperandrogenism-en.pdf (stating that IOC 
Consensus Meeting recommends IOC suspend IAAF’s Hyperandrogenism Regulations until 
resolution of Chand’s appeal or introduction of new evidence by IAAF). 
45 See Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 14–25 (listing in detail all of IAAF’s regulations regarding female 
athletes, especially those who are intersex and/or those who have hyperandrogenism); see also Robert 
W. Luckinbill & Ronald S. Katz, Changing Sex/Gender Roles and Sport, 28 STANFORD LAW & POLICY 
REVIEW 215, 232–34 (2017) (describing evolution of IOC’s and IAAF’s regulations regarding 
hyperandrogenism as well as IOC’s adoption of IAAF policies). 
46 See, e.g., Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 42–43 (explaining that 10 nmol/L is cutoff between men and 
women); see also Amanda Schaffer, Gender Games: The Olympics Has a New Way to Test Whether Athletes 
Are Men or Women.  Is it Fair?, SLATE (Jul. 25, 2012, 7:30 AM) (reviewing a study in which more than 
one quarter of Olympic-level male athletes had testosterone levels “below the normal male range”). 
47 See, e.g., Robert Wood, Gender Testing at the Olympic Games, TOPEND SPORTS, 
http://www.topendsports.com/events/summer/gender-testing.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2017) 
(reviewing difficulties when determining cutoff for Olympic-level athletes, as women were typically 
below 3 nmol/L, men ranged between 7 and 30 nmol/L). 
48 See, e.g., The Associated Press, Naturally High Testosterone Snares Female Athletes in Rio, NBC NEWS 
(Aug. 15, 2016, 3:52 PM) (explaining normal females typically have testosterone below 3 nmol/L 
while Olympic-level females tend to have higher levels of testosterone, partially due to fact that 
Olympic-level female athletes are 140 times more likely to be hyperandrogenic). 
49 See, e.g., Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 36–9 (explaining that intersex female athletes and those with 
androgen insensitivities are unable to absorb the extra levels of testosterone in their bloodstream, 
providing them no advantage similar to males); see also Greene, supra note 14, at 69–80 (differentiating 
between endogenous and exogenous testosterone and the absorption abilities of both within the 
female body). 
50 See Johanna Gretschel, IAAF Releases New Study as it Tries to Reinstate Rules on Testosterone, FLOTRACK 
(Jul. 6, 2017) (restating new finding by IAAF that the unabsorbed testosterone provides little to no 
advantage for androgen insensitive female athletes, which creates only a 2–4% advantage). 
51 See generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (holding higher levels of testosterone were not proven to give 
hyperandrogenic athletes a competitive edge); see also Associated Press, IOC Rules Transgender Athletes 
Can Take Part in Olympics Without Surgery, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2016, 8:04 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2016/jan/25/ioc-rules-transgender-athletes-can-take-part-in-
olympics-without-surgery (reiterating idea that higher levels of testosterone have not been proven to 
give athletes competitive advantage). 
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androgenic hormone, but it is not the only factor that can produce a difference 
between the genders.52 
 
C. International Legal Gender Recognition  
 
 The Olympics, as an international organization, required transgender athletes 
to complete sex reassignment surgery before reclassification of gender occurred.53  
However, several countries restrict or prohibit sex reassignment surgery.54  In 2012, 
there was an international move to recognize transgender individuals without first 
requiring the surgeries.55  Argentina was the first country to offer “sex-change surgery 
[as] a legal right.”56  Argentina “include[s the procedure] in both public and private 
health care plans.”57  Denmark’s Parliament was the first European country to institute 
a similar policy to Argentina, which “allow[s] legal gender recognition for transgender 
people over the age of 18, solely based on their self-determination – without any 
medical intervention.”58  More specifically, countries such as Colombia, Ireland, and 
Malta eliminated barriers to legal gender recognition.59  Several countries even legally 
recognized a third gender beyond the typical male-female dichotomy.60  In Nepal, the 
“third gender category [is recognized] on voter rolls (2010), the federal census (2011), 
citizenship documents (2013), and passports (2015).”61  “New Zealand and Australia 
now offer the option to have gender listed as ‘unspecified’ on official documents.”62  
                                                          
52 See generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (accepting testosterone as predictive factor of athletic 
advantage without scientific proof); see also Myron Genel, MD, Joe Leigh Simpson, MD & Albert de la 
Chapelle, MD, PhD, The Olympic Games & Athletic Sex Assignment, THE JAMA NETWORK (Oct. 4, 
2016), http://jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jama.2016.11850 (reviewing other types of 
congenital mutations that can create competitive advantage). 
53 See generally INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 44 (disbanding Stockholm Consensus that was 
approved in 2004 and required transgender athletes to undergo sex reassignment surgery before 
eligible competition); for full discussion and description of transgender athlete requirements, see infra 
notes 92–99 and accompanying text. 
54 See generally Neela Ghoshal & Kyle Knight, Rights in Transition: Making Legal Recognition for Transgender 
People a Global Priority, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2011), https://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2016/rights-in-transition (explaining that some countries have actively enforced laws 
disallowing ‘posing’ as the opposite gender including Nigeria, Kuwait, and Malaysia). 
55 See, e.g., id. (“[Argentina revised its law in 2012, stating] anyone over the age of 18 can choose their 
gender identity, undergo [sex] reassignment and revise official documents without any prior judicial or 
medical approval.”). 
56 Azadeh Ansari, Transgender Rights: These Countries are Ahead of the U.S., CNN (Feb. 23, 2017, 12:28 
PM), http://www.cnotescom/2017/02/23/health/transgender-laws-around-the-world/index.html 
(rejecting previous laws to allow for sex reassignment surgery as a right rather than a privilege). 
57 Id. (requiring health insurance to allow insured individuals access to sex reassignment surgery). 
58 Id. (stating that 34 countries in Europe require medical intervention or a psychiatric diagnosis in 
order to obtain changed gender recognition). 
59 See Ghoshal & Knight, supra note 54 (detailing Ireland’s identity-based legal gender recognition 
system put in place after same-sex marriage referendum passed). 
60 See, e.g., id. (including countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India, who all recognize the third 
gender hijras); see also Ansari, supra note 56 (detailing Malta’s, Iran’s, and India’s legal changes). 
61 Ghoshal & Knight, supra note 54; see generally Michael Bochenek & Kyle Knight, Establishing a Third 
Gender Category in Nepal: Process and Prognosis, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 11 (2012) (explaining history and 
current standing of Nepal’s “third gender” laws). 
62 Ghoshal & Knight, supra note 54 (describing several countries’ initiatives allowing for third gender 
category on official documents). 
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Canada has joined the movement along with “[a]t least seven countries [that] currently 
allow citizens to choose a non-binary option on their passports.”63 
 
 
D. U.S. Legal Gender Recognition 
 
 The United States leaves issuing new birth certificates and other identification 
mostly up to the individual states.64  Of the fifty states, four do not allow for a change 
in birth certificate recognition.65  The other forty five states and the District of 
Columbia (with the exception of Washington, who remains silent on the issue) will 
allow for the issuance of a new birth certificate, but all require that sex reassignment 
surgery has been completed.66  There has been a national move toward recognizing 
nonbinary individuals, however.67  Oregon was the first state to legally recognize 
nonbinary as a gender.68  California’s Governor Jerry Brown recently signed a bill that 
will go into effect in 2019 and will legally recognize a third gender.69  California’s Senate 
Bill 179 will also provide easier access for individuals changing their on state-issued 
documents, which previously required doctor approval.70  The federal government 
issues passports with a changed sex classification, but requires a “medical certification 
that indicates [a person is] in the process of or ha[s] had appropriate clinical treatment 
for gender transition.”71  The federal government, however, does not require that a 
person’s “citizenship evidence (e.g. U.S. birth certificate) and ID” match the updated 
gender marker on one’s passport.72 
 
                                                          
63 Andrew Blake, Third Gender Option Planned for Canadian Passports, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, LLC 
(May 5, 2017) http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/5/third-gender-option-planned-
canadian-passports/ (describing Canada’s effort to join other international powers to recognize third 
gender category on official documents). 
64 For a some of the statutes specifying when individuals can change sex classification on birth 
certificates, see infra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 
65 See Idaho Code § 39-250 (2005); see K.S.A. § 65-2422c (2009); see In re Estate of Gardiner, 29 Kan. 
App. 2d 92 (2001) (overruling administrative rule that allowed birth certificate gender change in 
limited circumstances); see Ohio Rev. Code § 3705.15 (2006); see Tenn. Code § 68-3-203(d) (2006). 
66 Compare Ala. Code § 22-9A-19(d) (2004); with Ga. Code § 31-10-23(e) (2005); with N.J. Stat. § 26:8-
40.12 (2006); with W. Va. Code § 16-5-25 (2006). 
67 See Hazel Cills, California Officially Recognizes Third Gender, JEZEBEL (Oct. 16, 2017) 
https://jezebel.com/california-officially-recognizes-third-gender-1819502627 (reporting California’s 
move to recognize gender outside of the binary). 
68 See id. (detailing history of other U.S. states’ move toward recognizing third gender) (“Last year 
Oregon legally recognized ‘nonbinary’ as a gender.  This year Washington, D.C. began offering non-
binary drivers licenses, and New York is considering similar legislation . . .”). 
69 See id. (explaining Governor’s support to legally recognize third gender option). 
70 For a list of states that require sex reassignment surgery or medical approval in order to change 
state-issued identification and birth certifications, see supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 
71 Gender Designation Change, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/passports/information/gender.html (last visited Aug. 
29, 2017) (underlining omitted); (“[A person’s] physician determines what appropriate clinical 
treatment is according to acceptable medical practices, standards and guidelines, and certifies that [a 
person] ha[s] had appropriate clinical treatment for gender transition to either male or female.  Surgery 
is not a requirement to get a U.S. passport.”) (bold lettering omitted). 
72 Id. (showcasing federal government’s reliance on genitals as indicator of gender). 
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E. History of Olympics’ Gender73 Verification 
 
 Women were not always allowed to participate in the Olympics.74  Once 
women were allowed to participate, the sports that were open to them were limited.75  
Further, a fear developed among athletes that men would pretend to be women so as 
to win an Olympic medal more easily.76  This fear became so widespread that officials 
took notice and, in 1966, the IOC forced women to participate in naked parades to 
verify their genitals.77  Men were excluded from these naked parades because a woman 
masquerading as a man would provide her with no athletic benefit or advantage, a 
modernly-held belief according to the IAAF and IOC.78  This method of determining 
sex left intersex athletes as targets.79 
 Nude parades also forced the idea that a person’s gender was directly related 
to their biological sex.80  Athletes were barred from competing as their gender identity 
if it conflicted with their genitals.81  Sex reassignment surgeries during the mid-
twentieth century were unsafe and rare, which restricted transgender athletes from 
competing in the body of their gender identity.82  In fact, there are no records of a 
transgender athlete participating in the Olympics while sex reassignment surgery was 
                                                          
73 For a discussion regarding the differences between sex, gender, and gender identity see supra notes 
17–31 and accompanying text; see supra note 53 for reference to transgender athletes being able to 
compete without sex reassignment surgery. 
74 See, e.g., Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 31 (discussing long and tumultuous history of women gaining 
access to athletic competition); see also Greene, supra note 14, at 59 (discussing emergence of women in 
sport); see also Laura A. Wackwitz, Verifying the Myth: Olympic Sex Testing and the Category “Woman,” 26 
INT’L WOMEN’S STUDIES FORUM 553, 553 (2003) (discussing emergence of women in sport). 
75 See Greene, supra note 14, at 60 (“The [IOC’s] conference produced a document entitled ‘Women’s 
Participation in Athletics’ which imposed substantial limitations and noted distinctions between male 
and female Olympic competition and provided a basis for the imposition of limits on those who 
qualify as female for purposes of Olympic competition.”). 
76 See, e.g., id. at 60–61 (using Helen Stephens as example of woman whose gender was questioned 
based on athletic excellence); see also Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 32 (discussing several instances in which 
female athletes were accused of “gender fraud”); see also UNIV. OF MINNESOTA, supra note 39 
(discussing Helen Stephens and Stella Walsh as examples of females accused of gender fraud). 
77 See, e.g., Greene, supra note 14, at 61 (discussing nude parades initiated by IOC in order to verify sex 
of athletes); see also Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 32–33 (discussing nude parades initiated by IOC in order 
to verify sex of athletes). 
78 See generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (ruling only women need to be tested for hormone levels). 
79 See, e.g., Greene, supra note 14, at 61 (discussing gender suspicion and several instances of female 
athletes having ambiguous genitalia); see also Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 32–33 (listing examples of female 
athletes attacked for suspicions of gender fraud); for a definition of the term ‘intersex,’ see supra notes 
34–37 and accompanying text. 
80 For a definition of each and discussion of why these terms are different, see supra notes 16–32 and 
accompanying text. 
81 For a discussion on how this is changing and the current transgender rules adopted by the IOC, see 
infra note 96 and accompanying text. 
82 See, e.g., Horatia Harrod, The Tragic True Story Behind the Danish Girl, THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 28, 2016, 
8:30 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/films/2016/04/14/the-tragic-true-story-behind-the-danish-
girl/ (outlining the history of first sex reassignment surgery in Germany in 1930 of Einar Wegener to 
Lili Elbe, who died one year after completion of surgery); see also The News Letter, Hopkins Hospital: A 
History of Sex Reassignment, THE JOHNS HOPKINS NEWS-LETTER (May 1, 2014), 
http://www.jhunewsletter.com/2014/05/01/hopkins-hospital-a-history-of-sex-reassignment-76004/ 
(discussing history of sex reassignment surgery in United States, including first sex reassignment 
surgery at  U.S. academic institution in 1965). 
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a requirement.83  A prevailingly modern view, even in the medical community, is that 
gender identity and sex organs need not be linked – a person can identify as a female 
without having characteristically female genitalia and it makes no difference on her 
psyche.84  
 Nude parades gave way to chromosomal testing due to the emergence of 
differences of sex development, such as intersex and androgen insensitivities.85  
Chromosomal testing occurs in the form of a buccal smear, which is an invasive testing 
method requiring blood and other body fluid samples.86  The test is designed to detect 
the “silent X” chromosome in females.87  If the silent X did not present in the test, it 
was assumed that the second chromosome was a Y and that the athlete was a male.88  
Not only did this present issues for intersex athletes, who can develop physically as a 
woman but have the chromosomes associated with males (XY), but it also presented 
issues for athletes that had other biological mutations.89  Athletes with biological 
mutations that caused them to have three chromosomes instead of two failed the 
buccal smear and were disqualified from Olympic competition.90  Buccal smears were 
replaced with the current method of testing which measures the testosterone hormone 
levels of athletes.91 
 Hormonal testing is an invasive method similar to buccal smears except that it 
tests for the nano mole per liter (nmol/L) levels of testosterone within an athlete’s 
blood serum.92  The IOC and other sports federations required transgender athletes to 
undergo hormone testing; however, only male-to-female transgender athletes were 
                                                          
83 See Associated Press, supra note 51 (arguing in favor of transgender athletes not requiring sex 
reassignment surgery and detailing IOC’s overruling of 2003 regulation that required reassignment 
surgery). 
84 See The News Letter, supra note 82 (“[Sexual Behavior Consultation Unit] Chair Jon Meyer . . . 
concluded that those who had the surgery were not more adjusted to society than those who did not 
have the surgery.  Meyer told The New York Times . . .  ‘My personal feeling is that surgery is not 
proper treatment for a psychiatric disorder, and it’s clear to me that these patients have severe 
psychological problems that don’t go away following surgery.’”) 
85 For definitions of ‘intersex’ and ‘androgen insensitivities,’ see supra notes 34–37 and accompanying 
text. 
86 See, e.g., Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 32–35 (explaining how buccal smear test and presence of “silent 
X” differentiates males from females); see also Greene, supra note 14, at 61–63 (discussing buccal smear 
test); see also Wood, supra note 47 (discussing buccal smear test). 
87 See, e.g., Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 32–35 (explaining how buccal smear test and presence of “silent 
X” differentiates males from females); see also Greene, supra note 14, at 61–63 (discussing buccal smear 
test); see also Wood, supra note 47 (discussing buccal smear test). 
88See, e.g., Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 32–35 (explaining how buccal smear test and presence of “silent X” 
differentiates males from females); see also Greene, supra note 14, at 61–63 (discussing buccal smear 
test); see also Wood, supra note 47 (discussing buccal smear test). 
89 See, e.g., Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 32–35 (explaining how buccal smear test and presence of “silent 
X” differentiates males from females); see also Greene, supra note 14, at 61–63 (discussing buccal smear 
test); see also Wood, supra note 47 (discussing buccal smear test). 
90 See, e.g., Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 32–35 (explaining how chromosomal combinations of XXY led to 
disqualification of athletes despite biological development as female); see also Greene, supra note 14, at 
61–63 (discussing buccal smear test); see also Wood, supra note 47 (discussing buccal smear test). 
91 See, e.g., INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 44 (noting IOC’s use of hormonal testing – specifically 
testosterone – as current method of gender verification). 
92 See, e.g., id. (stating IOC’s cut-off for testosterone level for female athletes as 10 nmol/L). 
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required to submit to hormone level regulation.93  Female-to-male transgender athletes 
were not required to undergo sex reassignment surgery or hormone testing due to the 
lack of biological advantage or physical superiority present.94 Male-to-female 
transgender athletes were determined to have both physical and biological advantages 
over other female athletes and were required to submit to hormonal testing during and 
after their transition.95  IOC guidelines in 2015 required any transgender woman to be 
legally recognized as such for four years before she could participate as a female in the 
Olympic Games.96  Further, her testosterone levels had to remain below 10 nmol/L 
before and during competition or she risked being disqualified from both categories 
of competition.97 
                                                          
93 See, e.g., Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 35 (“[T]he policy seems to be concerned only about the transition 
of transgender women . . . The fact that this purportedly general policy only makes sense when 
applied to transgender women belies its drafters’ biased assumption of the athletic inferiority of natal 
females.”). 
94 See, e.g., id. at 34–36 (discussing discriminatory nature of hormone testing due to emphasis on male-
to-female transgender athletes). 
95 See, e.g., id. (discussing disproportionate effect on male-to-female transgender athletes due to 
perceived inherent athletic advantage of men) 
96  1) Transgender guidelines 
A. Since the 2003 Stockholm Consensus on Sex Reassignment in Sports, there has 
been a growing recognition of the importance of autonomy of gender identity in 
society, as reflected in the laws of many jurisdictions worldwide. 
B. There are also, however, jurisdictions where autonomy of gender identity is not 
recogni[z]ed in law at all. 
C. It is necessary to ensure insofar as possible that trans athletes are not excluded 
from the opportunity to participate in sporting competition. 
D. The overriding sporting objective is and remains the guarantee of fair 
competition.  Restrictions on participation are appropriate to the extent that they 
are necessary and proportionate to the achievement of that objective. 
E. To require surgical anatomical changes as a pre-condition to participation is not 
necessary to preserve fair competition and may be inconsistent with developing 
legislation and notions of human rights . . . 
G. These guidelines are a living document and will be subject to review in light of 
any scientific or medical developments . . . 
1. Those who transition from female to male are eligible to compete in the male 
category without restriction. 
2. Those who transition from male to female are eligible to compete in the female 
category under the following conditions: 
2.1. The athlete has declared that her gender identity is female.  The declaration 
cannot be changed, for sporting purposes, for a minimum of four years. 
2.2. The athlete must demonstrate that her total testosterone level in serum has 
been below 10 nmol/L for at least 12 months prior to her first competition (with 
the requirement for any longer period to be based on a confidential case-by-case 
evaluation, considering whether or not 12 months is a sufficient length of time to 
minimize any advantage in 
women’s competition). 
2.3. The athlete's total testosterone level in serum must remain below 10 nmol/L 
throughout the period of desired eligibility to compete in the female category. 
2.4. Compliance with these conditions may be monitored by testing.  In the event 
of non-compliance, the athlete’s eligibility for female competition will be suspended 
for 12 months. 
INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 44 (providing explicitly that men are perceived to have 
inherent athletic advantage so only male-to-female athletes are subject to regulations). 
97 See id. (explaining requirements for transgender athletes to remain eligible). 
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 Hormonal testing raised issues not only for transgender athletes, but for those 
with intersex conditions, androgen insensitivities, and other congenital disorders.98  
Intersex athletes and those with androgen insensitivities tend to produce higher levels 
of testosterone than other female athletes.99  Hyperandrogenism, which is a congenital 
disorder, leads to elevated levels of testosterone due to an androgen insensitivity.100  
Hyperandrogenism causes individuals to develop as females but have higher levels of 
testosterone, leading many to be unaware of their condition.101  Further, other 
congenital disorders can result in increased athletic ability but are not detected by 
testosterone regulation.102  There is little to no evidence suggesting that intersex 
athletes and those with androgen insensitivities have a competitive advantage over 
women that produce less testosterone.103  In fact, an androgen insensitivity inherently 
means that that female is unable to absorb the extra testosterone in her blood.104  This 
means that a woman with an insensitivity could absorb potentially the same levels of 
testosterone as normally-producing women.105 
 The guidelines proffered by the IOC and the IAAF have been challenged 
before by athletes accused of gender fraud or a competitive advantage.106  The most 
recent case that resulted in a challenge to the hyperandrogenism rules came in the form 
of Dutee Chand’s appeal to the CAS.107  Chand was suspected of having a competitive 
advantage based on her exceptional sprinting times and her gait that resembled that of 
a male despite her small frame.108  Chand’s appeal was met with the IOC’s suspension 
of its hyperandrogenism rules, as well as a recommendation from the IOC Consensus 
Meeting to “revert to CAS with arguments and evidence to support the reinstatement 
of its hyperandrogenism rules.”109 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
98 For definitions of intersex and androgen insensitivity, see supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text. 
99 Id. (defining hyperandrogenism and fact that this DSD inherently results in overproduction of 
testosterone). 
100 Id. (providing within definition of ‘hyperandrogenism’ that androgen insensitivities result in 
overproduction but non-absorption of testosterone). 
101 See generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (describing facts that led to Chand’s appeal as well as how 
she was unaware of her hyperandrogenic condition); see infra notes 140–161 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of Chand’s legal battle and discussion of how she was unaware of her DSD. 
102 Genel, et al, supra note 52 (discussing other congenital mutations that lead to heightened athletic 
performance yet do not disqualify athletes from competition). 
103 See, e.g., Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 2–5 (differentiating between endogenous and exogenous 
testosterone and explaining Chand’s higher levels of testosterone are due to androgen insensitivity – 
i.e., hyperandrogenism). 
104 See, e.g., id. (differentiating between exogenous testosterone and endogenous testosterone, as one is 
naturally occurring within the body and the other is supplied intravenously as a way to ‘dope’). 
105 See generally id. (hinting at fact that women with DSDs produce excess testosterone but have a 
condition that makes them insensitive to testosterone and other androgens, which means they may 
not be absorbing any excess hormones). 
106 See generally Guardian Sport, supra note 40 (detailing Semenya’s case against the IAAF). 
107 See Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 2–14 (detailing procedural posture of case). 
108 Id. (discussing suspicion-based testing and reasons for members of SAI and AFI to suspect Chand 
of DSD). 
109 INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 44 (explaining posture and outcome of Chand’s appeal). 
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F.  Legal Issues Raised in CAS 
 
1. Constitutional Issues 
 
 The right to privacy in the United States can be found in both the Fourth and 
the Fourteenth Amendments.110  The Fourth Amendment right to privacy protects 
individuals from warrantless searches and seizures.111  This right was first protected in 
Katz where the court found that individual citizens have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy against these searches and seizures.112  Since Katz, the Fourth Amendment 
protection has moved toward reasonableness of state action.113  This viewpoint was 
contested early on in Fourth Amendment progeny in both Terry and Schmerber where 
the court focused on dignity and bodily integrity.114  Terry was a stop and frisk case that 
aimed to protect against “intrusion upon the sanctity of the person.”115  Although the 
Schmerber court did not find a violation of the individual’s right to privacy, the case 
centered on a blood sample taken to be used as evidence in an upcoming trial.116  
Regardless of Terry and Schmerber, the court has continued its move toward 
reasonableness of state action and away from constitutional liberties typically protected 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.117 
 The Fourteenth Amendment’s right to privacy was founded in Griswold as a 
penumbra of the First, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.118  Roe expanded this 
right to privacy and stated that the right was “founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
                                                          
110See generally Elise Holtzman, “I am Cait,” But it’s None of Your Business: The Problem of Invasive 
Transgender Policies and a Fourth Amendment Solution, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1943 (2016) (arguing an 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that would protect invasion of privacy based on more than 
unreasonableness of state action). 
111 See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (developing Fourth Amendment law as 
reasonable expectation of privacy against warrantless searches and seizures rather than protection of 
constitutional liberties as under Fourteenth Amendment). 
112 See generally id. (limiting Fourth Amendment protection to unreasonableness of state action rather 
than extent of bodily invasion); see also Holtzman, supra note 110, at 1956–75 (detailing historical 
interpretation of Fourth Amendment and arguing for broader and more modern interpretation so as 
to protect transgender individuals). 
113 See Holtzman, supra note 110, at 1956–75 (detailing historical interpretation of Fourth Amendment 
and arguing for broader and more modern interpretation so as to protect transgender individuals). 
114 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (focusing on bodily integrity and dignity of individual citizen in 
stop and frisk case); see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (holding that use of blood 
sample for evidence in trial was not invasion of privacy, though dissent argued for similar Terry bodily 
integrity standard); see also Holtzman, supra note 110, at 1956–75 (arguing for broader and more 
modern interpretation of Fourth Amendment that encompasses bodily integrity and selective 
disclosure standards). 
115 Terry, 392 U.S. at 16–17 (employing a standard that focused on the bodily invasion of an individual 
and not state reasonableness).  
116 See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767 (holding that use of blood sample for evidence in trial was not 
invasion of privacy, though dissent argued for similar Terry bodily integrity standard). 
117 See Holtzman, supra note 110, at 1956–75 (detailing historical interpretation of Fourth 
Amendment). 
118 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a right to privacy does not exist under 
the Fourteenth Amendment literal language but a right to privacy can be found in Due Process Clause 
through penumbras of First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments). 
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concept of personal liberty.”119  This right to liberty contrasts the Fourth Amendment 
right in that it does not actually protect individuals against bodily intrusion.120  
However, Justice Stevens dissented in Cruzan, stating that “[t]he sanctity, and 
individual privacy, of the human body is obviously fundamental to liberty.”121 
 
2. Title VII 
 
 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects individuals from 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, and religion in the 
employment arena.122  Scholars have argued that Title IX of the Education Act of 1972 
expands Title VII’s reach to athletic competitions when athletic federations are viewed 
as “employers.”123  Assuming that the Olympic Games qualify as an employer to the 
athletes that compete, Title VII protects these same athletes from discrimination based 
on their sex.124  The seminal case interpreting Title VII is Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.125  
That case established that sex discrimination simply means “unlawful . . . 
discriminat[ion] against women because they are women and against men because they 
are men.”126  Over the years, sex discrimination has expanded to include gender 
identity discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination.127   
 The most recently contested case dealing with the expansion of Title VII is 
Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College.128  This case was instituted by a college professor at 
a community college in Indiana who had been denied tenure and promotions after 
years of working at the school.129  The professor, a lesbian woman with a long-term 
partner, sued on the basis of Title VII discrimination and argued that the college 
denied her job security and promotions due to her sexual orientation.130  Although 
                                                          
119 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (pinpointing the exact language in the Fourteenth 
Amendment that allows for a right to privacy to exist in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights). 
120 See Holtzman, supra note 110, at 1956–75 (comparing and contrasting Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments’ interpretations of ‘right to privacy’). 
121 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 342 (1990) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (arguing 
that majority should have used a broader interpretation of Fourteenth Amendment to protect against 
bodily invasions typically protected under Fourth Amendment). 
122 Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et. seq.; see also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/titlevii.cfm 
(last visited Dec. 19, 2017) (reciting text from statute and giving broad overview of Title VII’s reach 
and import). 
123 See Kristi L. Schoepfer, Title VII: An Alternative Remedy for Gender Inequity in Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 107 (2000) (arguing that Title VII obviously reaches sports arena due to 
universities, colleges, and sports associations being employers). 
124 See generally id. (arguing “employers” should be read broadly to encompass sports organizations). 
125 See Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) (dictating standard for sex 
discrimination interpretation). 
126 Id. at 1085 (holding standard of sex discrimination hinges on the discrimination occurring because 
of the discriminated individual’s sex). 
127 See generally Hively, 830 F.3d 698 (holding sex discrimination includes sexual orientation 
discrimination); see generally also Macy, 2012 WL 1435995 (holding sex discrimination includes gender 
identity discrimination). 
128 See generally Hively, 830 F.3d 698. 
129 See generally id. (arguing lack of promotion and tenure was discrimination). 
130 See generally id. (holding sexual orientation typically is not included in sex discrimination but 
outcome determinative test can allow for Title VII expansion where changing plaintiff’s sex would not 
have resulted in same discrimination). 
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sexual orientation is not included in the protections of Title VII – only on the basis of 
sex is protected – the plaintiff argued that had she been a man, no discrimination 
would have occurred.131  This argument has been used as a way to expand Title VII’s 
protections to sexual orientation and employs what the court has entitled the outcome 
determinative test.132  The majority in the Hively opinion essentially stated that sex 
discrimination can occur any time the outcome would change if a person’s sex was 
changed.133  For example, when a lesbian professor is fired by a university, the court 
should hypothetically change the sex of the discriminated party (here, the professor).134  
If the firing occurred because the professor had a wife and was lesbian, changing the 
sex of the professor would create a heterosexual relationship and, therefore, no 
discrimination.135  The dissent argued that this outcome determinative test should only 
change one variable (simply changing the sex of the professor without changing sexual 
orientation) rather than two variables (changing both the sex and sexual orientation) 
but the majority disagreed.136 
 Both the traditional Title VII analysis and Hively and its progeny are applicable 
to the Olympics’ regulations regarding transgender and hyperandrogenic athletes.137  
The traditional Title VII analysis is applicable to the Hyperandrogenism Regulations 
because the Olympics should be, if they are not already, considered an employer for 
the sake of discrimination lawsuits.138  Further, although Hively’s expansion and 
reasoning may not be necessary in an analysis of the Hyperandrogenism Regulations, 
applying Title VII to issues of gender identity and DSDs is a slight expansion of sex 
discrimination.139 
 
III. CHAND V. AFI & IAAF 
 
A.  Background and Precipitating Events 
 
 Dutee Chand is an Indian sprinter who rose to fame in 2014 after “she won 
gold medals in the women’s 200 met[er] sprint and the women’s 4 x 400 met[er] spring 
                                                          
131 See generally id. (holding that outcome determinative test means swapping plaintiff’s sex to male so 
that she would have been a man married to a woman, therefore resulting in no discrimination). 
132 See generally Hively, 830 F.3d 698 (holding sexual orientation discrimination can be determined by 
court by using outcome determinative test in which discriminated individual’s sex is changed and 
court analyzes whether outcome would have been different under these circumstances). 
133 See generally id. (employing outcome determinative test). 
134 See generally id. (holding lesbian professor who was fired and refused promotions would have been 
promoted and retained as employee if professor’s spouse was a male, thereby failing outcome 
determinative test). 
135 See generally id. (employing outcome determinative test). 
136 See generally id. (holding outcome determinative test expands to sexual orientation specifically by 
changing only the sex of the plaintiff without affecting any other variable). 
137 For a full discussion regarding the legal impact of Title VII and Hively on the IOC’s 
Hyperandrogenism Regulations and Transgender Regulations see infra notes 243–255 and 
accompanying text. 
138 Schoepfer, supra note 123 (arguing that Title VII obviously reaches sports arena due to universities, 
colleges, and sports associations being employers). 
139 For a discussion of Title VII as related to the author’s proposal, see infra notes 269–273 and 
accompanying text. 
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relay at the Asian Junior Track and Field Championships [AJTFC].”140  After her race, 
because she had previously been an unknown athlete, the IAAF investigated her for 
use of prohibited drugs.141  Chand was subject to “a months-long process of medical 
scrutiny [and] trips to foreign clinics for batteries of tests” all without knowledge 
regarding the purpose of the testing.142  The testing began in June 2014, just one month 
after her wins at the AJTFC, and continued until August 2014 when the Sports 
Authority of India (SAI) delivered to the AFI all of Chand’s medical records.143  The 
SAI determined that “the test results sa[id] she [was] ineligible to compete in the 
women’s competition [and] that [her results] indicate[d] she ha[d] excess androgen” 
levels.144  The AFI delivered a letter to Chand on August 31, 2014 informing her of 
her disqualification and the necessary steps for instatement.145  The AFI, in their letter, 
did not address Chand’s right to an appeal or the basis of her suspension.146  In 
response, Chand contacted the Secretary General of the AFI stating that the “high 
androgen levels produced by [her] body [are] natural” and that she did “not dope[] or 
cheat[].”147  Chand added that in order for her to “follow the IAAF guidelines . . . 
attached, [she would] have to undergo medical intervention.”148  The SAI, on the same 
day as Chand’s letter to the AFI, also wrote to the AFI reiterating its intended support 
of Chand and asking that the AFI support Chand’s appeal to the CAS.149 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
140 Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 2 (outlining Chand’s athletic history and success and her quick rise to 
fame). 
141 See id. at 3–4 (reciting facts necessary to appeal where Director of AFI asked to meet Chand shortly 
after 2014 gold medal wins to undergo “routine doping test”). 
142 The Associated Press, supra note 48 (finding that suspicion-based testing often leaves athletes 
unaware of reason behind medical examination with examiners often stating that tests are being run 
for performance enhancing drugs). 
143 See Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 6 (following delivery of medical records to AFI Chand was 
suspended from further athletic competition). 
144 Id. at 7 (“SAI had conducted a test on [the Athlete] for suspected Hyperandrogenism and the tests 
were found positive.  We have recommended that she be excluded from participation in women’s 
events till her hyperandrogen level is brought down to permissible limits.”) 
145 See id. at 8 (allowing for reinstatement “in any Competition in athletics” as long as IAAF guidelines 
regarding testosterone levels are met). 
146 See id. at 7 (detailing AFI’s letters to SAI, suggesting SAI inform Chand of her disqualification and 
right to appeal rather than AFI informing athlete). 
147 Id. (furthering idea that athletes are told medical examinations are conducted for suspicion of 
doping, not DSDs). 
148 Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 8 (excerpting Chand’s letter to Secretary General of AFI explaining 
that high levels of testosterone were not due to performance enhancing drugs) (“The high androgen 
level produced by my body is natural.  I have not doped or cheated.  If I follow the IAAF guidelines 
you have attached, I will have to undergo medical intervention in order to reduce my naturally-
produced androgen level.”). 
149 See id. at 8–9 (“The SAI’s letter went on to note that the Athlete ‘has great potential of excelling in 
athletics internationally’ and explained that SAI had therefore included her into a training program[] . . 
. [and] requested the AFI to support the Athlete’s efforts to resume competing by allowing her to 
compete nationally and internationally without asking her to undergo any medical intervention.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
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B.  Chand v. AFI & IAAF 
 
 Chand appealed the AFI’s and the IAAF’s decision to suspend her from 
athletic competition in September 2014.150  The appeal went to the CAS, where the 
Panel listed four issues that were to be decided: 
 
(a) Do the Hyperandrogenism Regulations discriminate impermissibly 
against certain female athletes on the basis of: (i) a natural physical 
characteristic; and/or (ii) sex? 
(b) Should the Hyperandrogenism Regulations be declared invalid on 
the basis that there is insufficient scientific evidence: (i) that 
endogenous testosterone improves athletic performance in female 
athletes; and/or (ii) that 10 nmol/L is the scientifically correct 
threshold at which female athletes are in the “male range” or 
endogenous testosterone and therefore enjoy the benefits of male 
levels of androgens? 
(c) Are the Hyperandrogenism Regulations disproportionate in the 
context of: (i) the fact they discriminate on the basis of a natural 
physical characteristic and/or sex; and/or (ii) the harm they cause 
to female athletes? 
(d) Are the Hyperandrogenism Regulations invalid because they are a 
form of unauthorised [sic] anti-doping sanction in violations of 
Articles 4.3.3, 10 and 23.2.2 of the World Anti-Doping Agency 
Code?151 
 
The Panel further noted that the “substantial difference in athletic performance 
between elite male athletes and elite female athletes” required a division based on the 
sex binary.152  The Panel also conceded that “sex in humans is not simply binary” and 
that “[t]here is no single determinant of sex.”153  The Panel also stated its disapproval 
of “subject[ing] athletes to gender verification; or to mere examination of external 
genitalia; or to chromosomal testing in order to determine eligibility to compete as 
women or for the purpose of making a determination about their sex or gender 
status.”154  After stating the issues, the accepted factual background, and the 
concessions not at issue, the Panel detailed the relevant regulations.155 
                                                          
150  See id. at 25 (“On 26 September 2014, the Athlete filed her Statement of Appeal with the CAS 
Court Office . . . the Athlete nominated Professor Richard H. McLaren as an arbitrator and elected to 
proceed in English.”). 
151 Id. at 10 (excerpting issues listed by Panel). 
152 Id. at 11 (stating that division of male and female is necessary to fair competition as perceived by 
IAAF, but Panel will not address any contentions arising from this fact).  
153 Id. at 11–12 (“There are people with differences in sexual development (‘DSDs’) who do not 
biologically fall neatly into traditional categories of women and men . . . Nevertheless, since there are 
separate categories of male and female competition, it is necessary for the IAAF to formulate a basis 
for the division . . . for the benefit of the broad class of female athletes.”). 
154 Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 12 (departing from long-held traditions and standards of gender 
verification and testing in previous years). 
155 See id. at 13–25 (including the Olympic Charter, IAAF Constitution, IAAF Regulations Governing 
Eligibility of Females with Hyperandrogenism to Compete in Women’s Competition, IAAF 
Competition Rules 2014-2015, and The World Anti-Doping Code). 
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 The Panel decision reviewed the evidence presented by both Chand and the 
IAAF and their respective expert witnesses.156  Ultimately, the Panel was “unable to 
uphold the validity of the [Hyperandrogenism] Regulations.  The Panel therefore 
suspend[ed] the Hyperandrogenism Regulations for a period of two years.”157  Chand 
was reinstated on both a national and international competition level in this interim 
two-year period.158  The Panel stated that “[s]pecifically, the IAAF ha[d] not provided 
sufficient scientific evidence about the quantitative relationship between enhanced 
testosterone levels and improved athletic performance in hyperandrogenic athletes.”159  
Lastly, the Panel, although it suspended the Hyperandrogenism Regulations for two 
years, allowed the IAAF to file new evidence within this period.160  The Panel stated 
that if the IAAF chose not to or could not submit further evidence within the two year 
period, the Hyperandrogenism Regulations would be declared void.161 
 
IV. IAAF’S NEW EVIDENCE 
 
A.  Contested Issues 
 
 The IAAF recently came forward with new studies relating to the 
Hyperandrogenism Rules that were contested in Chand’s appeal.162  The IAAF remains 
steadfast in its determination that the elite female athlete threshold for testosterone 
levels should be 10 nmol/L.163  This number has been critiqued and criticized by 
                                                          
156 See id. at 25–158 (detailing all evidence presented to CAS, including scientific studies, expert 
witnesses, and legal arguments). 
157 Id. at 158 (“For the reasons explained above, the Panel concludes that the IAAF has not discharged 
its onus of establishing that the Hyperandrogenism Regulations are necessary and proportionate to 
pursue the legitimate objective of organising [sic] competitive female athletics to ensure fairness in 
athletic competition.”). 
158 See id. at 160 (holding Hyperandrogenism Regulations were invalid, suspended for two years) (“The 
Hyperandrogenism Regulations are suspended for a period of no longer than two years from the date 
of this Interim Award.  In the interim, Ms. Dutee Chand is permitted to compete in both national and 
international-level athletics events.”). 
159 Id. (failing to prove hyperandrogenic female athletes confer any significant athletic advantage from 
excess testosterone levels) (“In the absence of such evidence, the Panel is unable to conclude that 
hyperandrogenic female athletes may enjoy such a significant performance advantage that it is 
necessary to exclude them from competing in the female category.”). 
160 See Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 160 (allowing IAAF to provide further evidence of testosterone as 
providing athletic advantage) (“In the event that the IAAF submits [further] evidence, the Panel will 
issue further directions enabling the Athlete to respond to that evidence and listing the matter for a 
further hearing for the Panel to consider whether that evidence is sufficient to establish the validity of 
the Regulations.”). 
161 See id. (“In the event that the IAAF does not file any evidence within that two-year window (or if it 
notifies the CAS in writing that it does not intend to file such evidence) then the Hyperandrogenism 
Regulations shall be declared void.”). 
162 See Stephane Bermon & Pierre-Yves Garnier, Serum Androgen Levels and Their Relation to Performance in 
Track and Field: Mass Spectrometry Results from 2127 Observations in Male and Female Elite Athletes, BR. J. 
SPORTS MED. (Jul. 12, 2017), http://bjsm.bmj.com/content/early/2017/06/26/bjsports-2017-
097792 (putting forth new study of Olympic-level athletes including their testosterone ranges). 
163 See id. at 6 (concluding that free testosterone in female athletes’ blood serum was unaffected by 
athletic event and, therefore, testosterone levels should be closely monitored for women with 
hyperandrogenism and higher levels of free testosterone). 
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several groups of researchers in the past.164  The University of Rochester’s medical 
library lists the range of “normal male” testosterone as 9.7 nmol/L and 38.1 nmol/L.165  
The same institution lists the range for females as 0.5 to 2.4 nmol/L.166  The Sports 
Integrity Initiative compared several studies of testosterone levels, including those 
from the  University of Rochester, the U.S. National Library on Medicine, BJU 
International, and the IAAF.167  The lowest male level found was 6.46 nmol/L and the 
highest was 38.76 nmol/L.168  These studies were all conducted with non-athlete males, 
as it is generally agreed that elite athletes have higher levels of testosterone.169  While 
these studies focused mostly on male levels of testosterone, another study found that 
“16.5% of men had low testosterone levels, whereas 13.7% of women had high levels 
with complete overlap between the sexes.”170  These studies confirm that the cutoff 
the IAAF has chosen for testosterone levels remains contested.171  Further, one of the 
main issues Chand raised in her appeal to the CAS focused on the fact that only women 
athletes are tested. Therefore, men can fall below this testosterone limit while women 
cannot rise above it.172  If it is true that testosterone levels fall on an spectrum even 
across the sexes, then any cutoff used to separate the sexes seems arbitrary.173 
 
B.  New IAAF Study 
 
 The study was accepted for publication in May 2017 and it studied androgen 
concentrations obtained from elite athletes during the 2011 and 2013 IAAF World 
                                                          
164 See generally Andy Brown, Testosterone is Not Exclusively a Male Hormone, SPORTS INTEGRITY 
INITIATIVE (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.sportsintegrityinitiative.com/testosterone-is-not-exclusively-
a-male-hormone/ (compiling data from several scientific sources regarding testosterone in normal 
men and women as well as normal ranges for male and women athletes). 
165 See id. (providing one example of scientific evidence that conflicts with IAAF’s new study) (“The 
US University of Rochester’s online medical library states that the normal ‘male’ range for 
testosterone is between 9.7nmol/l and 38.1nmol/l; and between 0.5nmol/l and 2.4nmol/l for 
‘females’” (citing John Hanrahan & Rita Sather, Total Testosterone, UNIV. OF ROCHESTER MED. CTR. 
(last updated 2017), 
https://www.urmc.rochester.edu/encyclopedia/content.aspx?ContentTypeID=167&ContentID=test
osterone_total)). 
166 See id. (providing another scientific source differing from IAAF’s new study) (citing Hanrahan & 
Sather, supra note 165). 
167 See id. (depicting graph with recent medical studies and the ranges of testosterone found in “normal 
males”). 
168 See id. (depicting graph with “normal male” ranges of testosterone that reach higher and lower than 
those stated by the IAAF). 
169 See id. (stating on graph that it is generally understood that all elite athletes – male and female – 
have higher testosterone levels than non-athletes). 
170 ML Healy et. al., Endocrine Profiles in 693 Elite Athletes in the Postcompetition Setting, U.S. NAT’L 
LIBRARY OF MED. (Aug. 2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24593684 (providing 
evidence that athletes have fluctuating testosterone levels that vary for several reasons – including 
overtraining – resulting in a spectrum of testosterone levels instead of discrete categories). 
171 See generally id. (providing evidence that spectrum of testosterone means any cut-off will be 
arbitrary). 
172 See Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 154 (“There is, however, an assumption involved in the 
Hyperandrogenism Regulations as a proportionate justification for discriminating between females.”) 
(furthering idea that women are inherently less athletic than men). 
173 For further discussion on the testosterone spectrum and proposals moving forward, see infra notes 
202–280 and accompanying text. 
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Championships.174  The study details several different events in the sport of track and 
field and looks at both male and female competitors for most of the results.175  
However, blatantly missing from the study are the testosterone levels of female 
sprinters, the event in which Chand competes.176  Instead, the study simply states that 
“male sprinters showed a higher [free testosterone] concentration than the other male 
athletes.”177  The study also states that “[f]emale athletes with high [free testosterone] 
levels have a significant competitive advantage over those with low [free testosterone]” 
levels.178  The study goes on to “conclude[] that despite these higher [free testosterone] 
levels in male sprinters, no pattern of advantage from elevated testosterone levels was 
found.”179  Instead, the study seems to prove the point that free testosterone (at least 
the unabsorbed endogenous testosterone, the kind that Chand and other 
hyperandrogenic athletes possess excess levels of) creates “no pattern of advantage . . 
. in any of the . . . events.”180   
 The study further fails to discuss the difference between endogenous and  
testosterone.181  Endogenous testosterone is naturally-occurring testosterone 
produced by the body.182  It is this free (unabsorbed) testosterone that leads to higher 
levels of the hormone in hyperandrogenic athletes.183  Meanwhile, exogenous 
testosterone appears in an athlete’s blood serum through doping.184  The study cited 
by the IAAF was co-sponsored with the World Anti-Doping Agency.185  Because of 
this, it seems odd that the difference in testosterone is not addressed by the 
scientists.186 
                                                          
174 See generally Bermon & Garnier, supra note 162 (relaying data of testosterone ranges in athletes 
across several sports within track and field genre). 
175 See generally id. (examining most events within track and field except for those in which Chand 
competes). 
176 See generally id.; see also Andy Brown, IAAF Study Shows Chand Case is Far From Over, SPORTS 
INTEGRITY INITIATIVE (Jul. 5, 2017), http://www.sportsintegrityinitiative.com/testosterone-is-not-
exclusively-a-male-hormone/ (glaring lack of data for Chand’s events) (“Perhaps surprisingly given 
Chand’s chosen discipline, the study doesn’t discuss the impact of elevated testosterone on female 
sprinters, only male sprinters.”). 
177 Bermon & Garnier, supra note 162, at 2 (detailing free testosterone levels for males in different 
competition categories without focusing on absorbed levels of hormones). 
178 Id. at 1 (neglecting to differentiate between endogenous and exogenous testosterone in blood 
serum). 
179 Brown, supra note 164 (furthering question of whether free testosterone necessarily links to 
heightened athletic advantage). 
180 Id. (raising issue of endogenous versus exogenous testosterone, contending that free testosterone 
does not have inherent link to absorbed testosterone or athletic advantage); for a discussion of 
endogenous testosterone and its effects and relationship to hyperandrogenism and androgen 
insensitivities, see supra notes 99–105 and accompanying text. 
181 See Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 154 (discussing endogenous testosterone in women giving them a 
competitive advantage, where endogenous testosterone is naturally-occurring and exogenous 
testosterone is externally-induced). 
182 See id. (explaining difference between endogenous and exogenous testosterone and other 
hormones). 
183 See id. (discussing difference between absorbed and unabsorbed testosterone in body) 
184 For the CAS’s contended issues, which address only endogenous testosterone, see supra note 151 
and accompanying text. 
185 See id. (revealing sponsors of recent study, both of which proffered and supported 
Hyperandrogenism Regulations). 
186 See generally Bermon & Garnier, supra note 162 (failing to acknowledge difference in exogenous and 
endogenous testosterone in elite athletes). 
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C.  IAAF’s Return to CAS 
 
 After publishing its study that concluded female athletes with higher levels of 
free testosterone exhibit a competitive advantage over females with lower levels of 
free testosterone, the IAAF stated that it plans to return to the CAS.187  The IAAF’s 
study stated that “in certain events female athletes with higher testosterone levels can 
have a competitive advantage of between 1.8-4.5% over female athletes with lower 
testosterone levels.”188  With this new evidence in hand, the IAAF plans to return to 
the CAS in order to reinstate the Hyperandrogenism Regulations, which were 
suspended through Chand’s first appeal.189  If the IAAF is unable to provide enough 
scientific evidence to convince the CAS Panel that the Hyperandrogenism Regulations 
are necessary and fair, the Regulations will be void.190  Until the new CAS decision is 
issued, Chand will be eligible to participate in all national and international 
competitions.191 
 Upon return to the CAS, it is assumed the IAFF’s main argument will rely on 
the “competitive advantage” it found in relation to women with higher levels of free 
testosterone.192  However, in the initial appeal that Chand took the CAS, the Panel 
noted that a small competitive advantage would not in and of itself make the 
Hyperandrogenism Regulation fair.193  The Panel specifically stated that the male 
versus female competitive advantage fell around 10-12%.194  Meanwhile, the Panel also 
stated that a competitive advantage of merely 1-2% (numbers proposed by Chand’s 
expert witness) would not be enough to confer validity on the Regulation.195  The Panel 
                                                          
187 See IAAF Athletics, Levelling the Playing Field in Female Sport: New Research Published in the British Journal 
of Sports Medicine, IAAF (Jul. 3, 2017), https://www.iaaf.org/news/press-release/hyperandrogenism-
research (“The article published today . . . is part of the evidence that the IAAF is preparing for its 
return to CAS.”). 
188 Id. (restating results from Bermon & Garnier, supra note 162, at 6); see also PTI, Dutee Chand’s 
‘Gender Case’ to be Re-Opened, IAAF to Return to CAS, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Jul. 4, 2017), 
http://www.hindustantimes.com/other-sports/dutee-chand-s-gender-case-to-be-re-opened-iaaf-to-
return-to-cas/story-vqQ77jYyIECGaJkIksiVTI.html (restating results from recent IAAF study); see 
also Brown, supra note 176 (restating results from recent IAAF study). 
189 See generally IAAF Athletics, supra note 187. 
190 See Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 160 (“In the event that the IAAF does not file any evidence 
within that two-year window (or if it notifies the CAS in writing that it does not intend to file such 
evidence) then the Hyperandrogenism Regulations shall be declared void.”) (detailing two-year bar 
placed on IAAF to bring forward new evidence). 
191 See PTI, supra note 188 (“The IAAF, however, made it clear that the Hyperandrogenism 
Regulations remain suspended pending the resolution of the CAS proceedings and its decision to 
return to the top court of world sports will have no impact on the IAAF World Championships, to be 
held in London in August.”) (explaining continued suspension of Hyperandrogenism Regulations 
until all CAS decisions have been rendered). 
192 See supra notes 187–191 and accompanying text. 
193 See Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 155 (showcasing Panel’s reluctance to concede that excess 
testosterone causes athletic advantage) (“The evidence does not, for example, establish an advantage 
of the order of 12% rather than, say 1% to 3%.”). 
194 See id. at 154 (“The Panel accepts the evidence that male athletes have a competitive advantage 
over female athletes of the order of 10-12%.”) (accepting that significant advantage could justify 
gender categorization for competition). 
195 See id. at 155 (“Once the degree of competitive advantage is established, the IAAF would then need 
to consider, if the degree of advantage were well below 12%, whether that justified excluding women 
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remained silent on what competitive advantage would make the Regulation valid, but 
the Panel reiterated that it required substantial difference.196  The lack of a substantial 
competitive advantage found by the IAAF’s study as well as the fact that endogenous 
testosterone is naturally-occurring makes it a likely possibility that the 
Hyperandrogenism Regulations will become void after the next Panel decision.197  This 
would raise a new difficulty in the IOC’s ability to classify athletes in discrete 
categories.198  The IOC has gone through various ways to classify athletes based on 
sex, starting with nude parades, then chromosomal testing, and now hormone 
testing.199  If the CAS does decide in favor of Chand and other hyperandrogenic 
athletes, the IOC would have to determine a new method for classifying the sexes.200  
The next section details several testing methods that have been raised as well as a new 
proposal.201 
 
V. PROPOSALS FOR IOC 
 
A.  Gender Identity 
 
 Some scholars have suggested that the IOC use athletes’ gender identities as 
the separation method in competition.202  This is a progressive view, which suggests 
that athleticism should not be dependent upon the sex assigned at one’s birth.203  
Further, it allows athletes to be autonomous in their gender identity which is validated 
when an international athletics body recognizes the intricacies of gender as a 
concept.204  Lastly, some have contended that because the IOC disbanded the sex 
reassignment requirement for transgender athletes that some athletes would abuse this 
method of determining competition categories by changing their legal gender without 
                                                          
with that advantage from the female category.”) (giving reasons why separate male and female 
categories are justified based on athletic advantage). 
196 See id. (denying IAAF’s arguments based on lack of evidence and correlation between increased 
testosterone and competitive advantage) (“However, the evidence does not go so far as to equate, or 
correlate, the levels of testosterone in females with a percentage increase in competitive advantage.”). 
197 See id. at 155 (requiring a higher level of advantage in order to justify Hyperandrogenism 
Regulations) (“The evidence does not, for example, establish an advantage of the order of 12% rather 
than, say 1% to 3%.”). 
198 See infra notes 199–280 and accompanying text. 
199 See supra notes 74–109 and accompanying text. 
200 See infra notes 201–280 and accompanying text. 
201 See infra notes 202–280 and accompanying text. 
202 See INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 44 (“To require surgical anatomical changes as a pre-
condition to participation is not necessary to preserve fair competition and may be consistent with 
developing legislation and notions of human rights.”) (supporting idea that athletes need not undergo 
sex reassignment surgery in order to compete as one’s gender identity even if it conflicts with sex 
assigned at birth). 
203 See generally id. (“The overriding sporting objective is and remains the guarantee of fair competition.  
Restrictions on participation are appropriate to the extent that they are necessary and proportionate to 
the achievement of that objective.”) (explaining why restrictions and testosterone testing must exist 
even though sex reassignment surgery is no longer required). 
204 For a discussion on gender and gender identity as concepts, see supra notes 21–31 and 
accompanying text. 
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sex reassignment surgery.205  This contention is highly speculative and lacks 
understanding of gender identity.206   
 This method presents several legal hurdles for the international and the U.S. 
community of athletes.207  First, some countries either do not allow gender 
reassignment or make the process difficult.208  Second, even if the IOC does not 
require sex reassignment surgery, all of the states in the U.S. require sex reassignment 
surgery before gender reassignment on identification cards.209  This presents an issue 
for the IOC because an athlete wanting to compete under a different sex must first be 
legally recognized in order to be classified for Olympic competition.210  In order to 
overcome the present legal issues both in the U.S. and internationally, the IOC would 
need to revise its current competition procedure.211  The IOC would need to disregard 
all gender identification requirements currently in place and allow athletes to simply 
state their gender.212  Issues could arise under this honor policy and its mere 
implementation would be costly, progressive, and time-consuming.213 
 
B.  Other Hormones 
 
 Chand and her expert witnesses suggested in the CAS Panel’s interim decision 
that testosterone was not a determinative factor when considering competitive 
advantage in athletes.214  Testosterone, they suggested, is not determinative because 
                                                          
205 See Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 34–36 (detailing Stockholm Consensus adopted by IOC in 2004 
requiring transgender athletes to undergo sex reassignment surgery, legal recognition as opposite 
gender, and sufficient hormone therapy before competition) (“These unnecessary restrictions may 
contribute to the fact that despite the adoption of the Stockholm Consensus by many international 
sport federations . . . no transgender athletes have competed in the Olympics pursuant to this 
policy.”); see also INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 44 (disbanding previous Stockholm Consensus in 
favor of new regulations governing hyperandrogenic and transgender athletes). 
206 See Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 34–36 (discussing criticisms of Stockholm Consensus including 
disproportionate implications on transgender women, imposition of Consensus as ‘sincerity test’ to 
‘gender fraud’); for a discussion on gender and gender identity as concepts, see supra notes 21–31 and 
accompanying text. 
207 For a discussion of international laws regarding gender identity and the United States’ approach to 
the same, see supra notes 53–72 and accompanying text. 
208 For a discussion of international laws regarding gender identity and the United States’ approach to 
the same, see supra notes 53–72 and accompanying text. 
209 See id. (describing laws nationally and internationally with a majority of countries and states 
requiring sex reassignment surgery before gender reassignment, with the very recent exception of 
California). 
210 See INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 44 (providing as one requirement for competition that an 
athlete’s gender identity be legally recognized). 
211 See id. (listing requirements for athletes that want to compete under different gender identity than 
current identification); for a discussion of international laws regarding gender identity and the United 
States’ approach to the same, see supra notes 53–72 and accompanying text (providing countries and 
states that would pose an issue to IOC changing its policy). 
212 See INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 44 (requiring legally recognized gender as bar to 
competition, IOC would need to revise this regulation); see also Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 49–54 
(presenting issues regarding uniform gender identity rule and IOC’s unwillingness to accept athlete’s 
gender identity as anything other than plot to compete in ‘easier’ competition category). 
213 See Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 34–36 (detailing IOC’s acceptance of Stockholm Consensus and 
required sex reassignment surgery in previous years as ‘sincerity test’ to weed out gender fraudsters). 
214 See Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 155 (rejecting Chand’s position and determining that testosterone 
is, in fact, dispositive predictor of competitive advantage). 
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not all testosterone that naturally occurs in a person’s body is necessarily absorbed.215  
Hyperandrogenic and androgen sensitive individuals typically overproduce 
testosterone without absorbing it and feeling its effects.216  Other hormones, such as 
androgens, are more determinative when considering athletic advantage.217  
Androgens, Chand contended, are more proportional to absorbed testosterone levels 
and, therefore, do not correspond to free, unabsorbed testosterone.218  While this 
suggestion is not scientifically proven as of yet, it could be a way for the IOC to 
maintain suspicion-based hormone testing with a hormone that actually confers a 
competitive advantage.219  Further, it should be noted that even testosterone’s effects 
on an athlete’s athletic advantage has not been proven.220 
 While this proposal moves to be a conciliatory step in the right direction, it 
would not eliminate suspicion-based testing or invasive testing procedures.221  
Acceptance of this proposal would concede that hormone testing is an objective 
measure of athletic performance and advantage.222  Some scholars remain steadfast in 
their belief that hormones vary vastly among men and women and no hormone test 
will properly identify an athlete’s athletic advantage.223  Instead, body mass, muscle 
mass, oxygen usage and other indicators of athletic advantages should be the measure 
employed by the IOC.224 
 
C.  Legal Issues Surrounding First Two Proposals 
 
 The first two proposals pose legal issues that the CAS refused to consider.225  
These issues included invasion of privacy through invasive testing methods, 
                                                          
215 See id. (“The Panel has accepted testosterone is the best indicator of performance difference 
between male and female athletes.”). 
216 See supra notes 181–186 and accompanying text. 
217 See Dr. James Simon, Androgen, HEALTHY WOMEN (last updated 2017), 
http://www.healthywomen.org/condition/androgen (“[R]esults from blood tests are often misleading 
and may not be conclusive because there is no agreement on just what constitutes ‘normal’ androgen 
levels in women . . . Further, many standard laboratory tests, optimized for measuring testosterone in 
men, may not be sensitive enough to accurately measure women’s levels.”). 
218 See generally Mayo Clinic, Testosterone, Total and Free, Serum, MAYO CLINIC MED. LAB. (last updated 
2017), https://www.mayomedicallaboratories.com/test-catalog/Clinical+and+Interpretive/8508 
(discussing free testosterone and its relation to absorbed testosterone levels, as well as high levels of 
testosterone when sex hormone binding serum concentration remains constant). 
219 See generally id. (allowing for continuation of suspicion-based testing while negating testosterone as 
accepted hormone). 
220 See Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 160 (failing to prove hyperandrogenic female athletes confer any 
significant athletic advantage from excess testosterone levels) (“In the absence of such evidence, the 
Panel is unable to conclude that hyperandrogenic female athletes may enjoy such a significant 
performance advantage that it is necessary to exclude them from competing in the female category.”). 
221 See Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 42–43 (discussing CAS’s, IOC’s, IAAF’s practice of suspicion-based 
testing). 
222 See generally Bermon & Garnier, supra note 162 (relying on testosterone as hormonal marker of 
competitive advantage in Olympic-level athletes). 
223 For a full discussion regarding the conflicting scientific sources studying testosterone levels in men 
and women see supra notes 162–201 and accompanying text. 
224 See Genel, et al, supra note 52 (reviewing other types of congenital mutations that can create 
competitive advantage). 
225 For a discussion of the legal barriers posed by the first proposal see supra notes 207–213 and 
accompanying text. 
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disproportionate effect on women by use of suspicion-based testing, and 
discriminatory effects on women due to transgender policies only affecting 
transgender women and hyperandrogenic rules only affecting women with DSDs.226 
 
1. Invasion of Privacy 
 
 Some scholars have argued that the Fourth Amendment was historically 
intended to protect citizens from invasion of bodily contact.227  Although the doctrine 
has been interpreted as reasonableness of state power rather than constitutional 
liberties, one scholar has argued for a change in Fourth Amendment interpretation.228  
Under Terry and Schmerber, which both focus on dignity and bodily integrity, the 
invasive testing of the IOC would violate constitutional protections in the U.S.229  
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to privacy is less about actual bodily 
invasion and more about a right against state intervention.230  The right to privacy 
initially founded under Griswold and Roe would likely not protect athletes from invasive 
testing.231  However, Stevens’ dissent in Cruzan focused on “[t]he sanctity, and 
individual privacy, of the human body” which “is obviously fundamental to liberty.”232  
Stevens’ interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment would protect athletes from the 
invasive testing method used by the IOC and endorsed by the CAS.233  Stevens’ dissent 
protects the dignity of each human body and merges the two lines of interpretation 
regarding “invasion of privacy,” which seems to be the Constitution’s intent.234 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
226 See Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 40–44 (discussing CAS’s endorsement of IOC’s suspicion-based 
testing and testosterone-based categories); see generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (holding by CAS 
Panel allowing for hormone testing with testosterone as indicator of athletic advantage and suspicion-
based testing). 
227 See generally Holtzman, supra note 110 (arguing for expansion of Fourth Amendment protection); 
for a full discussion of the history of the Fourth Amendment and Holtzman’s argument for expansion 
see supra notes 110–117 and accompanying text. 
228 See generally Holtzman, supra note 110 (arguing for expansion of Fourth Amendment protection); 
for a full discussion of the history of the Fourth Amendment and Holtzman’s argument for expansion 
see supra notes 110–117 and accompanying text. 
229 See generally Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (holding stop and frisk violated Fourth Amendment rights of 
individual due to invasion of person’s bodily integrity and dignity); see generally also Schmerber, 384 U.S. 
757 (dissenting view arguing for invasion of privacy due to ‘unreasonable’ blood sample used as 
evidence); for a full discussion of Terry and Schmerber see supra notes 110–117 and accompanying text. 
230 See Holtzman, supra note 110, at 1956–75 (comparing and contrasting Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments’ interpretations of ‘right to privacy’); see supra notes 118–121 and accompanying text. 
231 See generally Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (holding right to privacy only exists in penumbras of Bill of 
Rights and is a concept or personal liberty); see generally Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (following Griswold’s 
interpretation of Fourteenth Amendment as only protecting individual personal liberty). 
232 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 342 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (imploring majority to expand Fourteenth 
Amendment to include invasions of human body covered by Fourth Amendment right to privacy). 
233 See generally id. (expanding Fourteenth Amendment to protect against bodily invasion as Fourth 
Amendment would make Due Process Clause more than a conduit for notions of personal liberty). 
234 See generally id. (merging Fourteenth Amendment and Fourth Amendment would make Due 
Process Clause more protective for citizens). 
27                            DePaul J. of Sports Law, Volume 14, Issue 1 
 
 
 
 
2. Suspicion-based Testing 
 
 The law is silent on suspicion-based testing and the CAS has endorsed the 
practice.235  However, the IOC stated that the practice of mass testing was found to be 
a humiliating invasion of privacy.236  The IOC now has a practice of hand-selecting 
women that “express male attributes” and then ‘out’ these women (typically exhibiting 
DSDs) to the rest of the athlete community.237  This practice seems exponentially more 
humiliating than across-the-board testing of all women or all athletes.238  Lastly, during 
the actual testing process, athletes are kept in the dark about why the tests are being 
administered.239  In Chand’s case, she was unaware of her DSD and was not told by 
the medical professionals why she was being tested.240  It was only after the SAI 
delivered Chand’s records to the AFI that she, and the entire Indian athletic 
community, was informed of her diagnosis as hyperandrogenic.241  While there are not 
any laws prohibiting this suspicion-based testing, the practices employed by the IAAF 
and the IOC remain questionable.242 
 
3. Discriminatory Effects 
 
 Both the transgender regulations and the hyperandrogenism regulations 
proffered by the IAAF and adopted by the IOC only refer to women.243  The 
transgender regulations only place restrictions on transgender women (an individual 
who has undergone male-to-female sex reassignment surgery) because of the 
competitive advantage she may have.244  A similar rationale exists for only placing 
                                                          
235 See generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (accepting and endorsing IOC’s use of suspicion-based 
testing). 
236 See Stacy Larson, Intersexuality and Gender Verification Tests: The Need to Assure Human Rights and 
Privacy, 23 PACE INT’L L. REV. 215, 231–33 (2011) (discussing IOC’s progression through different 
gender verification methods and stating that IOC abandoned most due to degrading nature). 
237 See id. (clarifying that women modernly tested for gender verification must be recommended by 
medical director of international sporting event and upon complaint due to suspicion); see generally 
Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (explaining Chand’s experience during testing phase and her ‘outing’ to the 
international sporting community as hyperandrogenic). 
238 See generally Larson, supra note 236 (proposing appropriate testing methods and detailing contested 
legal issues surrounding testing based on international law, human rights laws and groups, and IOC’s 
historical battle with gender verification). 
239 See generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (explaining Chand’s experience during testing phase and her 
‘outing’ to the international sporting community as hyperandrogenic). 
240 See generally id. (ignoring issue that athlete may not be aware why testing is occurring, as local sports 
federations usually blame ‘doping’ suspicions). 
241 See id. at 7 (excerpting SAI’s letter to AFI regarding Chand’s heightened androgen levels); see supra 
notes 144–149 and accompanying text. 
242 See generally Larson, supra note 236 (proposing appropriate testing methods and detailing contested 
legal issues surrounding testing based on international law, human rights laws and groups, and IOC’s 
historical battle with gender verification). 
243 See INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 44 (stating that IOC Consensus Meeting recommends IOC 
suspend IAAF’s Hyperandrogenism Regulations until resolution of Chand’s appeal or introduction of 
new evidence by IAAF and excerpting IAAF’s Hyperandrogenism Regulations and providing excerpt 
of Transgender Guidelines); for an excerpt of the Transgender Guidelines proffered by the IOC see 
supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
244 See INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 44 (providing explicitly that men are perceived to have 
inherent athletic advantage so only male-to-female athletes are subject to regulations). 
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restrictions on women with DSDs.245  A woman that over-produces testosterone and 
other androgens is perceived to be an athletic threat to the other competitors.246  
However, both the transgender and the hyperandrogenism regulations would both 
violate even the narrow interpretation of Title VII under Ulane.247  Sex discrimination 
under Ulane is the “unlawful . . . discriminat[ion] against women because they are 
women.”248  Here, both regulations employed by the IOC are specifically targeted at 
women because they are women that may have a competitive advantage.249  Men are 
totally disregarded from both regulations.250 
 These regulations seem like by-the-book sex discrimination under Title VII.251  
However, Hively and its progeny, including Macy, have expanded sex discrimination 
over the years.252  Macy expanded sex discrimination to include gender identity 
discrimination and Hively expanded it to include sexual orientation discrimination.253  
Using the outcome determinative test of Hively, female athletes with higher 
testosterone levels would be reexamined as males with higher testosterone levels and 
would be able to compete in the Olympics.254  The expanded scope of Title VII, 
therefore, would result in a violation of this law.255 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
245 See generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (holding male athletes have a competitive advantage over 
female athletes and that female athletes with hyperandrogenism confer same male advantage due to 
heightened testosterone levels). 
246 See generally id. (holding that testosterone is indicator of athletic performance and advantage so 
women with DSDs are inherently more competitive than other women). 
247 See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085 (“[I]t is unlawful to discriminate against women because they are 
women and against men because they are men.”) (holding standard of sex discrimination is based on 
whether discrimination occurred simply because of the sex of the individual). 
248 Id. (setting sex discrimination standard narrowly so as to only apply to situations where 
discrimination occurs explicitly due to individual’s sex). 
249 See INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 44 (stating explicitly that women with DSDs have athletic 
advantage over women without DSDs and that men have competitive advantage over women so only 
male-to-female athletes must be regulated); see generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (holding male 
athletes have a competitive advantage over female athletes and that female athletes with 
hyperandrogenism confer same male advantage due to heightened testosterone levels); for an excerpt 
of the Transgender Guidelines proffered by the IOC see supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
250 See INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 44 (excluding men from testosterone checks and limitations 
and excluding female-to-male athletes from regulations); see generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 
(disregarding discriminatory nature of both regulations); for an excerpt of the Transgender Guidelines 
proffered by the IOC see supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
251 See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085 (“[I]t is unlawful to discriminate against women because they are 
women and against men because they are men.”). 
252 See generally Hively, 830 F.3d 698 (expanding sex discrimination using outcome determinative test 
and including sexual orientation discrimination as sex discrimination). 
253 See generally id. (holding sex discrimination includes sexual orientation discrimination); see generally 
also Macy, 2012 WL 1435995 (holding sex discrimination includes gender identity discrimination). 
254 See generally Hively, 830 F.3d 698 (using outcome determinative test). 
255 See generally id. (using outcome determinative test); see generally also Macy, 2012 WL 1435995 (holding 
sex discrimination includes gender identity discrimination). 
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D. Hormone Ranges 
 
 This proposal maintains the hormone testing some athletes are currently 
subject to while also incorporating elements from the first two proposals.256  The CAS 
Panel’s reasoning for suspending the Hyperandrogenism Regulations focused partially 
on the fact that no scientific evidence thus far proved testosterone a predictive factor, 
but also on the discriminatory nature of the Hyperandrogenism Regulations.257  The 
Regulations targeted women and only forced some women to undergo hormone 
testing.258  Further, the testing was suspicion based, which means not every woman or 
man undergoes testing indiscriminately.259  This proposal suggests indiscriminate 
hormone testing among athletes with a division based on specific ranges of hormone 
levels.260  This method of testing athletes across the board would eliminate some of 
the disproportionate and discriminatory effects currently imposed on women 
athletes.261 
 First, this proposal would impose mass testing on all athletes.262  While this still 
does pose a constitutional and invasion of privacy issue, the testing procedures would 
be applied to all athletes.263  Any kind of testing would pose a threat to invasion of 
privacy; however, the testing would be disclosed, applicable to all athletes, and simply 
a form of classification.264  The testing would not be done in order to disqualify athletes 
or under the guise of doping as it is currently.265  Instead, the testing would be 
completed in order to place athletes in a category commensurate with one’s athletic 
ability and advantage.266  Further, the testing would be comparable to that done in 
wrestling with weight classes, which has not raised constitutional issues.267  The entire 
                                                          
256 See Buzuvis, supra note 1, at 42–43 (discussing CAS’s, IOC’s, IAAF’s practice of suspicion-based 
testing); for a full discussion on the other two proposals see supra notes 202–219 and accompanying 
text. 
257 See Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 154–56 (listing Panel’s conclusions). 
258 See id. (“There is, however, an assumption involved in the Hyperandrogenism Regulations as a 
proportionate justification for discriminating between females.”). 
259 See id. at 3–4 (discussing facts surrounding Chand’s initial medical testing, which arose when AFI 
thought Chand was doping). 
260 See infra notes 275–280 and accompanying text. 
261 See generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (describing Chand’s contentions regarding IAAF’s 
Hyperandrogenism Regulations including discriminatory impact on women athletes). 
262 See generally Larson, supra note 236 (describing IOC’s intention to move away from mass testing 
methods). 
263 See generally Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261 (holding blood sample not invasion of privacy because use of 
sample was not unreasonable action by state); for a full discussion on the history and applicability of 
an individual’s right of privacy see supra notes 110–121 and accompanying text. 
264 See generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (detailing Chand’s testing timeline, including her lack of 
knowledge as to why testing was being administered). 
265 See INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 44 (disqualifying from competition female-to-male athletes 
and hyperandrogenic athletes that do not meet testosterone requirements). 
266 For a discussion of the classes athletes would be separated into under this policy see infra notes 
275–291 and accompanying text. 
267 See PIAA Wrestling Weight Control Program Guidelines, 
https://www.crsd.org/cms/lib5/PA01000188/Centricity/Domain/987/Wrestling_Weight_Program.
pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2017) (discussing full guidelines regarding wrestling weight classes, nutrition, 
measurement process); see also NCAA, Wrestling Rules of the Game, NCAA 
http://www.ncaa.org/championships/playing-rules/wrestling-rules-game (last visited Oct. 22, 2017) 
(detailing guidelines, penalties, and rules book for NCAA wrestling). 
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purpose behind the Hyperandrogenism Regulations and Transgender Guidelines was 
to instill fairness in the Olympic Games.268  Under this proposal, all athletes would be 
competing under the fairest rules possible.269 
 Second, this proposal would target all athletes competing in the Olympic 
Games.270  Therefore, both males and females (including athletes that are intersex, 
transgender, etc.) would be tested regardless of their gender identities, sexual 
orientations, or sex.271  Under a Title VII analysis, this would completely negate any 
sex discrimination issues raised by the current Hyperandrogenism Regulations and 
Transgender Guidelines.272  Additionally, as stated above, the purpose of this testing 
would be to place athletes in classes based on athletic advantage.273  Assuming 
androgens do confer athletic advantage on individuals, this would create the most fair 
athletic competition to date.274 
 This proposal of indiscriminate hormone testing works to incorporate the 
second proposal mentioned earlier, androgen testing.275  Chand and her expert 
witnesses suggested that androgens should be the hormone that is tested when 
determining competitive advantage, as discussed in the previous section.276  If 
androgens are the hormone that scientifically prove competitive advantage, then 
separating athletes based on their androgen levels should be the most equal and 
equitable way to divide competition categories (i.e., 1-9.99 nmol/L, 10-19.99 nmol/L, 
etc.).277  This proposal would render moot any issues that could arise under the first 
proposal in this section (gender identity) because athletes would no longer be separated 
by gender, but instead, androgen levels.278  In fact, the legal issues associated with 
gender identity would be moot for the same reason.279  Further, no discrimination 
between men and women would occur under this proposal because all athletes would 
be tested for their androgen levels and, thus, separated.280 
                                                          
268 See INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 44 (recommending that regulations be suspended due to 
CAS decision but remaining steadfast in contention that regulations maintained fairness); see generally 
also Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (holding regulations not inherently unfair as long as testosterone is 
determinative hormone). 
269 See generally Larson, supra note 236 (describing human rights organizations’ attempt to change IOC 
policy to ensure more fair competition). 
270 See supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
271 See supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
272 See generally Ulane, 742 F.2d 1081 (holding there must be discrimination and such discrimination 
must be on account of one’s sex). 
273 See generally Larson, supra note 236 (describing human rights organizations’ attempt to change IOC 
policy to ensure more fair competition). 
274 For a discussion of the classes athletes would be separated into under this policy see infra notes 
275–291 and accompanying text. 
275 See supra notes 214–219 and accompanying text for a discussion on hormone testing using 
androgens as the measuring mechanism rather than testosterone. 
276 See id. 
277 See id. 
278 See supra notes 202–208 and accompanying text. 
279 For a discussion of legal issues associated with individuals changing his or her gender identity on 
identification and other documents see supra notes 53–72 and accompanying text. 
280 See supra notes 259–260 and accompanying text. 
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 To provide an easily cognizable example, wrestling categories shall be 
employed.281  Wrestling, although typically a male sport, separates competing athletes 
based on body weight.282  Athletes are required to weigh-in on the day of their 
competition to confirm their current weight.283  Based on that number, the athletes are 
separated into competition categories.284  While weight may not be an indicator of 
athletic advantage in all sports, it provides wrestlers with a comparable and compatible 
competitor.285  Levels of androgens (assuming androgens more closely resemble 
athletic advantage over testosterone) would work in primarily the same fashion.286  
Chand and her expert witnesses proposed that hyperandrogenic women athletes had 
a 1-3% competitive advantage over women without DSDs and that assumed 
approximately a 10 nmol/L gap.287  If each 10 nmol/L gap results in a similar 
competitive advantage, there would be a significant gap between women without 
DSDs and typical males (around 20 nmol/L).288  This proposal combats that advantage 
by striking gender categories altogether and basing athletic competition ranges solely 
on athletic advantage.289  Further, this proposal has utilized androgen testing as the 
means for category separation.290  However, under the IAAF’s, IOC’s, CAS’s and 
Chand’s reasoning, this proposal could simply be applied to testosterone and 
implemented immediately.291 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
281 See PIAA Wrestling Weight Control Program Guidelines, supra note 267 (discussing full guidelines 
regarding wrestling weight classes, nutrition, measurement process); see also NCAA, supra note 267 
(detailing guidelines, penalties, and rules book for NCAA wrestling). 
282 See PIAA Wrestling Weight Control Program Guidelines, supra note 267 (discussing full guidelines 
regarding wrestling weight classes, nutrition, measurement process); see also NCAA, supra note 267 
(detailing guidelines, penalties, and rules book for NCAA wrestling). 
283 See Rule 9 § 2 Weigh-Ins, NCAA Wrestling 2017-18 and 2018-19 Rules and Interpretations, 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/WR19.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2017) 
(detailing procedure for day-of weigh-in). 
284 See id. (detailing procedure for day-of weigh-in). 
285 See generally id. (providing rationale for weight management and weight classification); see also PIAA 
Wrestling Weight Control Program Guidelines, supra note 267 (providing rationale for weight management 
and weight classification); see also NCAA, supra note 267 (providing rationale for weight management 
and weight classification). 
286 For another proposal suggesting androgens be the hormone determining competition categories 
see supra notes 214–226 and accompanying text. 
287 See Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 at 155 (showcasing Panel’s reluctance to concede that excess 
testosterone causes athletic advantage) (“The evidence does not, for example, establish an advantage 
of the order of 12% rather than, say 1% to 3%.”). 
288 For a full discussion regarding competitive advantage between men and women as well as between 
hyperandrogenic women and women without DSDs see supra notes 187–201 and accompanying text. 
289 See generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (describing IOC’s and IAAF’s emphasis on athletic 
advantage as justification for hormone testing). 
290 For another proposal suggesting androgens be the hormone determining competition categories 
see supra notes 214–226 and accompanying text. 
291 See generally Chand, CAS 2014/A/3759 (describing Chand’s contentions regarding IAAF’s 
Hyperandrogenism Regulations including discriminatory impact on women athletes, IAAF’s steadfast 
reliance on testosterone as predictor of competitive advantage, and CAS’s partial acceptance of 
IAAF’s stance). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 This article provided insight into the recent predicament facing the Olympics: 
gender determination.  The Olympics have a long history of attempting to equally and 
legally apply a gender standard across the board.292  Most recently, the IOC thought 
they struck this balance with hormone testing, but hyperandrogenism proved a 
difficult biological condition for which to account.293  With Chand’s appeal to the CAS 
Panel and the forced suspension of the Hyperandrogenism Regulations, the IOC must 
now reconsider a proper gender determination technique.294  Several scholars have 
proposed methods for doing this, but the IOC has not yet decided how to proceed.295  
The IAAF plans to return to the CAS with further evidence that testosterone-based 
testing is valid, but the IOC continues its suspension of the Hyperandrogenism 
Regulations in the meantime.296  Contentions and criticisms flow from most gender-
based categorical separation and because of this, this article has detailed several 
proposed solutions for the IOC.297  The last proposal – a total elimination of gender 
categories – is a radical suggestion that meets the goals of all parties involved.298 
                                                          
292 See supra notes 74–109 and accompanying text. 
293 See supra notes 92–109 and accompanying text. 
294 See supra notes 150–161 and accompanying text. 
295 For proposals suggested by scholars and author see supra notes 202–280 and accompanying text. 
296 For full discussion regarding the IAAF’s new study and its planned return to the CAS see supra 
notes 162–201 and accompanying text. 
297 For full discussions on these proposed solutions see supra notes 202–291 and accompanying text. 
298 For full discussion of last proposal see supra notes 256–280 and accompanying text. 
